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paradoxes and solutions to them, I would propose exactly the
same cause (violation of (2)) and exactly the same solution: (2)
reveals the objects involved aren’t the intensional objects they
seem to be.
Rabern, Rabern, and Macauley (‘Dangerous Reference
Graphs and Semantic Paradoxes’, corollary 13, forthcoming in
the Journal of Philosophical Logic) have shown that all sen-
tential paradoxes with finite reference chains require referential
circularity. I won’t pretend my proposal here will turn out able
to solve all sentential paradoxes. But it might well be able to
deal with circularity paradoxes of the two kinds Eldridge-Smith
has put forward.
Laureano Luna
IES Doctor Francisco Marin
News
Amsterdam Workshop on Truth, 13–15 March
The Amsterdam Workshop on Truth served as a meeting point
for researchers working on more or less formal approaches to
the philosophy of truth.
The first speaker was Volker Halbach, who distanced himself
from his earlier work with Leon Horsten on the axiomatisation
of Kripke’s theory of truth in partial logic PKF on the grounds
that mathematical induction is considerably weakened. Martin
Fischer’s talk showed whether or not certain paradoxes arising
from the interaction of modalities are reducible to paradoxes of
a single modality. Johannes Stern provided a proof-theoretic al-
ternative to Halbach and Welch’s work on understanding modal
predicates as the complex predicate of truth modified by a ne-
cessity operator (“necessarily true”) to circumvent the objec-
tion one may have to adopt Halbach and Welch’s possible world
semantics. Theodora Achourioti argued that in appropriate con-
texts truth exhibits intensional properties that resemble those of
an S4 modal operator. Jo¨nne Speck introduced tense operators
to express Kripke’s notion of groundedness within the object
language of an augmented theory of truth.
Nina Gierasimczuk provided a means of assessing belief re-
vision methods in terms of identifiability at the limit of the re-
vision processes. Sonja Smets presented a problem in applica-
tions of Dynamic Epistemic Logic to collective learning sce-
narios due to the phenomenon of “information cascades”, and
suggested a way forward.
Graham Leigh presented a variety of mathematical tech-
niques available to the proof-theoretic deflationary truth the-
orist, including infinitary cut elimination and model construc-
tions. Carlo Nicolai presented an axiomatic compositional the-
ory of truth with the syntax formalised in a theory of hereditar-
ily finite sets.
Paul Egre´ presented the strict-to-tolerant consequence theory
of truth he developed with Robert Van Rooij, Pablo Cobreros,
and David Ripley, with a distinction made between strict and
tolerant assertion. To continue this idea, Stefan Wintein pre-
sented a uniformed signed tableau calculus with strict and tol-
erant assertion and denial.
Giulia Terzian offered and assessed some proposals for mak-
ing more precise the notion of “simplicity” of truth in the de-
flationist literature. In the form of a dialogue, Jeffrey Ketland
defended the notion that semantic facts are not naturalistically
reducible.
Two talks were historically informed. Iris Loeb challenged
the view that a postscript that Tarski added in a later version
of “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen” in-
dicated that he moved from a semantic universalist to an anti-
universalist. Georg Schiemer presented methods in work by
Carnap and Tarski that allowed them to recast a model-theoretic
approach to metamathematics within type theory.
Albert Visser presented a simple construction of full satisfac-
tion classes with properties such as σn correctness, schematic
correctness and extensionality. Philip Welch summarised fea-
tures common to a wide variety of revision theoretic mecha-
nisms and presented “ineffable liars” that diagonalise past the
determinateness operators definable in Hartry Field’s theory of
truth. Finally, Leon Horsten argued that there are natural the-
ories of truth for the purposes of metamathematics that satisfy
both the demand of being semantically conservative and ex-
tending the expressive power of the object language in an ade-
quate way.
Abstracts and slides of the talks can be found here.
Cian Chartier
ILLC, Amsterdam
Logic, Knowledge and Language, 14–15 March
On the 14th and 15th of March 2013 the international confer-
ence Logic, Knowledge and Language was held in Brussels as
a tribute to Paul Gochet’s memory. Fourteen speakers who had
interacted with Gochet on topics related to the fields of formal
logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and ontology had
been invited. Even though some of them were eventually pre-
vented from joining the conference because of health problems
or climatic conditions, all sessions were very rich and intense.
Based on joint work with Klaus Frovin Jørgensen, Patrick
Blackburn’s paper re-examined Prior’s work on the semantics
of temporal indexicals through the lens of modern hybrid logic.
By indexing propositional symbols with names of moments of
time at which the propositions are true (@i p: p is true at i), we
can give an account of simultaneousness of (past and future)
events, as well as express complex propositions relying on Re-
ichenbach’s distinctions between points of speech, of reference
and of event. In such a system, an important role can played
by the “now”-operator acting as an index (or “rigidifier”) for
propositions.
Based on joint work with Henrik Boensvang and Rasmus
Rendsvig, Vincent Hendricks’ talk showed how multi-agent
modal logic (involving epistemic logic, game theory and judg-
ment aggregation) could be applied to formalize phenomena
involving “social proof” such as informational cascades—
observing many individuals make the same choice provides
evidence that outweighs one’s own judgment based on private
signal—and the bystander effect—individuals do not offer any
means of help to the victim in an emergency situation when
other individuals are present.
After commenting on the work that has been done in the
fields of logic for knowledge as well as of logic of knowledge,
Jacques Dubucs showed how logic can also be seen as provid-
ing insights to knowledge. In particular, analysis requires one
to enrich available information by considering information that
is not provided in what was given as well as by considering ob-
jects of another kind than the ones actually under investigation.
Susan Haack claimed that epistemology requires a theory
of beliefs. Even though she concedes to W.V.O. Quine that
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there are no sharply specifiable identity conditions for beliefs,
to S. Stich that a functionalist account of beliefs is inadequate
and to P. and P. Churchland that beliefs cannot be smoothly
reduced to neurophysiological states, she still claims that we
cannot do without knowing subjects and their beliefs, an (mod-
estly naturalistic) account of which should involve three inter-
locking dimensions: behavioral, neurophysiological and socio-
historical.
In order to give an account of Henri Poincare´’s claim that
there is a need for intuition (>< purely formal logic) in mathe-
matical proofs, Gerhard Heinzmann discussed several recent
proposals for the formal characterization of informal prov-
ability (especially Rahman’s dialogical type theoretical recon-
struction of the Erlangen notion of a Constructive Language
and Hintikka’s Independence-Friendly Logic) before develop-
ing his own reverse project of an informal characterization of
formal provability.
Willard Van Orman Quine’s and Paul Gochet’s nominalisms
were the focus of discussion of three talks.
Hourya Sinaceur gave an account of Gochet’s methodolog-
ical nominalism in the view of Ernst Cassirer’s distinction be-
tween substantial and functional identity; the question is not so
much to tell what a proposition is than to ask which functions
it fulfils and whether these functions could not be fulfilled by
sentences.
Jean-Maurice Monnoyer showed how Gochet highlighted
some of the main tensions and difficulties in Quine’s nominal-
ist positions. By commenting Quine’s “Logistical approach to
the problem of ontology” and his “Confessions of a confirmed
extensionalist”, Monnoyer discussed the feasibility of the nom-
inalist project in the light of some of Gochet’s own comments.
Dagfinn Føllesdal provided an idea of the way Quine had
planned to rewrite Word and Object around 1998, i.e., two years
before his death. The problems which Quine wanted to solve
were amongst the ones Gochet (and others) had stressed. First,
Quine wanted to involve some theory of perception in his book
in order to give an account of stimulation (which is central as
regards observation sentences) as empirically accessible. Sec-
ondly, Quine wanted to work out a new theory of modalities
in order to show that we need a non-unified semantics: singu-
lar terms do not have the same semantics as general terms; no
descriptive theory of names is possible.
Bruno Leclercq
Philosophy, Universite´ de Lie`ge
Philosophy of Information, 27–28 March
The fifth workshop on the Philosophy of Information took place
at the University of Hertfordshire 27th to 28th March 2013, or-
ganised by the UNESCO Chair in Information and Computer
Ethics in collaboration with the AHRC project ‘Understanding
Information Quality Standards and their Challenges’ (2011–
2013). The topic was the intersection between qualitative and
quantitative views of information. Nineteen papers were pre-
sented whose themes were diverse yet united by the application
of informational methods.
The keynote speaker, Dr Leonelli (Exeter) discussed Data
integration and the management of information in contempo-
rary biology. In particular, she reflected on what it means and
takes to integrate data to acquire new knowledge about biologi-
cal entities and processes, focusing specifically on the facilitat-
ing role of data-sharing tools. Continuing the biology theme,
Russo (Brussels and Kent) and Illari (Hertfordshire and UCL)
argued that biomarkers research can be used as a test case for
an informational account of causality, illustrating how even in
complex cases, the idea of tracing a causal link could still be
vital to the scientific practice.
In an interesting perspective on consciousness, Gamez (Sus-
sex) considered the question “Are Information or Data Patterns
Correlated with Consciousness?” He discussed how experi-
mental work on the correlates of consciousness is attempting
to identify the relationship between phenomenal and physical
states. While information integration is currently the only ex-
plicitly informational theory of consciousness, other algorithms
could be used to identify information patterns in the brain that
could be correlated with consciousness.
Algorithms were also discussed by Gobbo (L’Aquila) and
Benini (Leeds) in their co-authored paper on computational
complexity bringing together an aspect of information in Com-
puter Science that is quantitative and qualitative at the same
time: measuring, an act that is often described as ‘describing a
phenomenon by a number’. Other papers that were concerned
with modeling were given by Coghill (Aberdeen) and Anto´n
(Sevilla), while Hamami (Vrije) approached the topic from a
mathematical perspective
Two papers considered information security and individual
rights. Pym (Aberdeen) argued that information security is con-
cerned with the protection of the attributes of items of informa-
tion that are of value to the owners, users, and stewards of that
information. Taddeo’s (Warwick) paper addressed two chal-
lenging and ethical questions; namely, whether the transforma-
tions engendered by the information revolution create the need
for individuals to claim new rights for themselves as agents
living the onlife, and what such rights should be. Primiero
(Ghent) looked at distrust and mistrust relations for privatively
and modally qualified information channels.
Many of the papers referenced the work on the philosophy of
information carried out by Floridi (Hertfordshire and Oxford).
His paper, Maker’s Knowledge and the synthetic uninformative,
sought to understand what kind of knowledge this is as when
Alice (knows or rather) is informed (holds the information) that
Bob’s coffee is sweetened because she just put two spoons of
sugar in it.
The Workshop demonstrated that the philosophy of informa-
tion is a multi-faceted and topical field of research, not only in
itself, but also as a conceptual framework for other established
philosophical domains, allowing elaboration from an informa-
tional perspective.
Interested readers can see all the abstracts on the website of
Society for the Philosophy of Information and indeed, may be
inspired to join. Please visit here for further information.
Penny Driscoll
PA to Prof. Luciano Floridi, University of Hertfordshire
Thinking and Rationality, 29 March–7 April
The workshop on “Thinking and Rationality” was organized as
an event within the 4th World Congress and School in Universal
Logic (UNILOG 2013), held in Rio de Janeiro between March
29–April 7, 2013. The main intention was to discuss, not only
logical systems and logic theories, but why and how logic and
thinking can coexist and help to model, express and understand
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